We propose various zero knowledge protocols based on the algorithmic problem of finding isomorphisms between central simple algebras over number fields given by structure constants. We also design a protocol which is based on the hardness of finding an element with a prescribed minimal polynomial in a central simple algebra given by structure constants. This protocol allows arbitrarily long challenges and thus can be turned into a digital signature scheme.
Introduction
In this paper we propose an authentication system based on the following algorithmic problem (and its variants). Let A be a finite-dimensional associative algebra over a field K. Let b 1 , . . . , b m be a basis of A. Then the products b i b j can be expressed as linear combinations of the basis elements: b i b j = ∑ m k=1 γ ijk b k . The γ ijk are called structure constants and we consider A to be given by a collection of structure constants. Assume that A is isomorphic to M n (K), the algebra of n times n matrices over K. The algorithmic task is to compute an isomorphism between A and M n (K). We will refer to this problem as the explicit isomorphism problem. This is a well studied problem in computational algebra [14] , [13] , [18] , [16] , [5] . It has connections to arithmetic geometry [3] , [4] , [5] , norm equations [14] , parametrization of algebraic varieties [11] and error-correcting codes [10] . It is also known that when K = Q and A ∼ = M 2 (Q), then the problem of finding an isomorphism is at least as hard factoring integers [20] . Moreover, when K is a number field and n is large enough then the problem seems to be even harder than integer factorization. To our knowledge the difficulty of this problem has never been exploited for cryptographic purposes.
On the other hand Hartung and Schnorr [12] proposed and authentications system which relies on the difficulty of finding an explicit equivalence of integral quadratic forms. In a sense our schemes can be thought of as a higher degree generalization of the protocols in [12] as the equivalence problem of rational quadratic forms is very similar to the isomorphism problem of quaternion algebras. Our generalization however might allow much smaller keys as the current methods for solving the explicit isomorphism problem over number fields ( [14] ) are highly exponential in the n and in the degree of the number field (but polynomial in the size of the structure constants).
We will describe three protocols. They are all based on certain isomorphism problems. The first one is based on the explicit isomorphism problem. The second one relies on the difficulty of computing isomorphism between division algebras over number fields (this can be reduced to an instance of the explicit isomorphism problem but with a quadratic increase in the dimension of the algebra over K). The third one is based on the isomorphism problem of orders in central simple algebras. All these protocols are based on one-bit challenges. We also describe a protocol based on the problem of finding elements with prescribed minimal polynomials in a full matrix algebra given by structure constants. The advantage of this protocol is that it can give arbitrarily long challenges and thus can be turned into a digital signature scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section we summarize all known results which we will use later on. In the third section we give the detailed description of the protocols and prove their validity.
Preliminaries

Theoretical background
In this subsection we give a brief overview of the theoretical results needed for the descriptions of our protocols.
Definition 1. An associative algebra A over a field K is simple if it has no nontrivial two-sided ideals.
It is a well-know theorem of Artin that every finite dimensional algebra over a field K is isomorphic to a full matrix algebra over some division algebra whose center is an extension of K.
Definition 2. A simple algebra A is called central simple over K if its center is exactly K.
The tensor product of two finite-dimensional central simple K-algebras is again a central simple K-algebra. Two central simple algebras over K are Brauer equivalent if their underlying division algebras are isomorphic (note that by Artin's theorem a central simple algebra is a full matrix algebra over a division algebra). Equivalence classes of central simple algebras form a group under the tensor product, called the Brauer group of the field K. This implies that in order to understand central simple algebras over a fixed field one has to understand the division algebras over that field. Definition 3. Let K be a field and let L be a cyclic extension of K (i.e., a Galois extension whose Galois group is cyclic) of degree n . Let σ be a generator of the Galois group. Let a ∈ K. Then the following algebra A is called a cyclic algebra:
It is well known (see [17, Chapter 15] ) that a cyclic algebra is a central simple algebra over K of dimension n 2 . Moreover, the cyclic algebra (L|K, σ, a) is isomorphic to M n (K) if and only if a is a norm in the extension L|K. We conclude by the definition of an order in a central simple algebra:
Definition 4. Let R be an integral domain with quotient field K. Let A be a central simple K-algebra. A subring O of A is an order if it contains 1 and is a finitely generated R-module which contains a K-basis of
An order is called maximal, if it is maximal with respect to inclusion. Maximal orders are non-commutative analogues of the ring of integers in algebraic number fields. For further details on maximal orders the reader is referred to Reiner's monograph [19] .
Algorithmic background
In this subsection we give a brief overview of the algorithmic history of the explicit isomorphism problem.
Let A be an associative algebra given by a collection of structure constants. It is a natural algorithmic problem to compute the structure of A, i.e., compute its Jacobson radical rad A, compute the Wedderburn decompisition of A/rad A and finally compute an explicit isomorphism between the simple components of A/rad A and M n (D i ) where the D i are division algebras over K and M n (D i ) denotes the algebra of n × n matrices over D i . The problem has been studied for various fields K, including finite fields, the field of complex and real numbers, global function fields and algebraic number fields. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the radical of A over any field [2] . There also exist efficient algorithms for every task over finite fields [7] , [21] and the field of real and complex numbers [6] . Finally, when K = F q (t), the field of rational functions over a finite field F q , then there exist efficient algorithms for computing Wedderburn decompositions [15] and for computing explicit isomorphisms between full matrix algebras over F q (t) [13] .
As it turns out, the most difficult case is when K is an algebraic number field. Wedderburn decomposition can again be achieved in polynomial time [7] , but computing isomorphisms between central simple K-algebras is much harder. Rónyai [20] showed that computing an explicit isomorphism between A (given by structure constants) and M 2 (Q) is at least as hard as factoring integers. On the other hand, Ivanyos, Rónyai and Schicho proposed an algorithm to compute an isomorphism between A and M n (Q) which is allowed to call an oracle for factoring integers. Their algorithms is polynomial in the size of the structure constants but is exponential in n. The bound they provide on the number of steps is infeasible even for n = 10. The key difficulty of this problem lies in the fact that one has to compute a primitive idempotent in A which is hard as even computing a zero divisor is equivalent to finding a point on a Zariski closed set. If A is given by a cyclic algebra presentation, then finding an isomorphism between A and M n (Q) is equivalent to solving a norm equation over a cyclic extension which is a classical hard problem in computational number theory. Furthermore there is no known polynomial-time algorithm for computing a cyclic algebra presentation from a structure constant representation when n is at least 10 (there is a procedure for n = 2, 3 and for small n such a presentation can be computed from an explicit isomorphism). So in some sense this problem is harder than solving norm equations in cyclic extensions.
On the other hand, many computations with the structure constant representation can be carried out in polynomial time.
Proposition 5. Let A be a central simple algebra over Q of dimension n 2 and let a ∈ A. Then there exists a polynomial-time algorithm which computes the minimal polynomial of a over Q.
Proof. The the degree of the minimal polynomial of a is at most n. Then one checks if 1, a, . . . , a i are linearly independent starting with i = 0. If they are, then we increase i by 1 and check again. Checking linear independence boils down to solving a system of linear equations and the number of steps is at most n so the algorithm runs in polynomial time.
However, given a polynomial f ∈ Q[x] it is hard to find an element a ∈ A with minimal polynomial f (when n is large enough). Note that if the constant term of f is zero, then the suitable element should be a zero divisor. We will exploit this fact later in our digital signature protocol.
Zero knowledge protocols
In this section we give a short survey about the interactive proof system and zero knowledge protocols. We give the formal definition of the zero-knowledge protocol due to Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [9] . The reader can find the details in [8] . We also follow [8] giving the definitions. First we give the definition of an interactive machine.
Definition 6. [8, Definition 4.2.1] (An Interactive Machine): An interactive Turing machine (ITM)
is a (deterministic) multi-tape Turing machine. The tapes are a read-only input tape, a read-only random tape, a read-and -write work tape, a write-only output tape, a pair of communication tapes, and a readand-write switch tape consisting of a single cell. One communication tape is read-only, and the other is write-only. Each ITM is associated a single bit σ ∈ {0, 1}, called its identity. An ITM is said to be active, in a configuration, if the content of its switch tape equals the machine's identity. Otherwise the machine is said to be idle. While being idle, the state of the machine, the locations of its heads on the various tapes, and the contents of the writable tapes of the ITM are not modified. The content of the input tape is called input, the content of the random tape is called random input, and the content of the output tape at termination is called output.The content written on the write-only communication tape during a(time) period in which the machine is active is called the message sent at that period. Likewise, the content read from the read-only communication tape during an active period is called the message received (at that period). (Without loss of generality, the machine movements on both communication tapes are in only one direction, e.g., from left to right.)
Let A and B be a linked pair of ITMs, and suppose that all possible interactions of A and B on each common input terminate in a finite number of steps. We denote by A, B (x) the random variable representing the (local) output of B when interacting with machine A on common input x, when the random input to each machine is uniformly and independently chosen. (Indeed, this definition is asymmetric, since it considers only B's output.)
In the next step we define the (generalized) interactive proof system. The function g defined as g(n) = c(n) − s(n) is called the acceptance gap of (P, V), and the function e, defined as e(n) = max{1 − c(n), s(n)}, is called the error probability of (P, V). In particular, s is the soundness error of (P, V), and 1 − c is its completeness error. Let (P, V) be an interactive proof system for some language L. We say that (P, V), or actually P, is perfect zero-knowledge if for every probabilistic polynomial-time interactive machine V * there exists an (ordinary) probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm M * such that for every x ∈ L the following two random variables are identically distributed: P, V * (x) (i.e., the output of the interactive machine V * after interacting with the interactive machine P on common input x) and M * (x) (i.e., the output of machine M * on input x). Machine M * is called a simulator for the interaction of V * with P.
Now we give the formal definition of Perfect Zero-Konwledge. 
Description of the protocols
In this section we describe two types of zero knowledge protocols. The first kind are protocols which return one bit challenges and the second kind are protocols which can return arbitrarily long challenges. For the first type we describe three versions based on three different isomorphism problems: isomorphisms of full matrix algebras, isomorphisms of division algebras and isomorphisms of orders in central simple algebras. The other protocol is based on the hardness of finding an element with a prescribed polynomial in a central simple algebra. If the algebra is a full matrix algebra, then this is of similar difficulty then finding an isomorphism, however, when the algebra is a division algebra, then this problem could be more difficult.
General protocol
Let A 0 , A 1 be algebras isomorphic to M k (Q) given by structure constants (i.e., by a Q-basis and a multiplication table). Here k is some security parameter which should be around 10. We describe a zero-knowledge protocol based on the following data: the structure constants for A 0 , A 1 are the public keys and an isomorphism φ between A 0 and A 1 are private. The protocol is defined by the following procedure. Let P be the prover and V be the verifier. First P chooses an algebra B (with structure constants) and an isomorphism ψ : A 0 → B. This can be done by choosing a random element r in A 0 and conjugating A 0 by r (the probability that an element is invertible is large). Then P sends B to V but not the isomorphism ψ. Then V sends back a random bit i ∈ {0, 1}. Finally P sends back ψ • φ −i . If i = 0 then this is an isomorphism between A 0 and B, if i = 1, then this is an isomorphism between A 1 and B. This protocol is described in the following pictogram:
Division algebras
A variation of Protocol 1 could be to replace A 0 and A 1 by isomorphic division algebras of dimension k 2 over Q. For simplicity we assume that the security parameter k here is squarefree. Finding an isomorphism in this setting seems to be more difficult (it can be reduced to the matrix algebra case with security parameter k 2 [14, Section 4] ). However, finding a division algebra over Q is not obvious. Here we describe a method for constructing division algebras of degree k. Since k is squarefree, it is the product of distinct prime numbers. Let p be a prime number which divides k. We look for a division algebra in a cyclic algebra form D p = (K|Q, σ, a) where a ∈ Q, K is a cyclic extension of Q of degree p whose Galois group is generated by σ. The cyclic algebra D is a division algebra if a is not a norm in the extension K|Q . The fact that a is a norm can be described by a degree p equation. If we choose a random a (uniformly from a large interval), then by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma a will not be a norm with high probability. This provides a randomized polynomial time algorithm for constructing a division algebra of degree p. We construct the division algebras D p for every prime divisor p of k. Then
is a division algebra of degree k as its order in the Brauer group equals its degree.
We have to mention that there are several other standard ways of constructing division algebras over Q (for example using Hasse invariants).
Orders in central simple algebras
Another variations of Protocol 1 is the following. Now assume that A is a central simple algebra of dimension k 2 over Q (it may be a division algebra or a full matrix algebra as well) and let O be an order in A. Now we assume that an algebra is not only given by structure constants, but also with a starting order. Instead of having an isomorphism between A 0 and A 1 we have an isomorphism between the two algebras which is an isomorphism restricted to the orders as well. Note that an order in A can be computed in polynomial time (by multiplying the original basis elements by a suitable integer which makes the corresponding structure constants integral), thus finding an isomorphism between orders is more difficult than finding isomorphisms between central simple algebras.
We could also restrict ourselves to isomorphisms between orders which are in some sense bounded. An isomorphism between two algebras can be represented by a k 2 × k 2 matrix and we could require this matrix to have bounded integer entries.
Long challenges
This protocol differs more from the original one as the previous two. The reason is that we need a protocol where the verifier can send back arbitrarily long challenges (not just one bit challenges as in Protocol 1) because such a protocol can be turned into a digital signature scheme [1] , [12] .
Again we start with A 0 and A 1 which are full matrix algebras over Q given by structure constants. The public key consists of A 0 and A 1 (with their structure constant representation) and a random element a ∈ A 0 . The isomorphism φ between A 0 and A 1 is private. Then the first step is the same, P chooses an isomorphism ψ between A 0 and B and sends B to V. Then V chooses an isomorphism δ between B and C and sends over C and δ as well. Then P computes A ′ = δ(ψ(φ −1 (a))) and sends over a ′ . Finally V checks whether a and a ′ have the same minimal polynomial and accepts if this is satisfied. This procedure is summarized in the following pictogram:
Key generation
In this subsection we describe how one can generate keys for our protocols.
In the general protocol we have to give a structure constant representation of A 0 and A 1 , both of which are isomorphic to M k (Q). This can be achieved in the following manner. Choose a random Q-basis of M k (Q). This can be accomplished in various ways. The best is probably to choose k 2 random matrices which will form a basis with high probability. Indeed, they are linearly independent if the matrix formed by them has determinant zero which is a polynomial of degree k 2 with k 4 variables. It is actually also important that none of the basis elements be a zero divisor. This again can be avoided by a suitable random choice. Given a basis b 1 , . . . b k 2 we can compute structure constants efficiently. Let this algebra be A 0 . Then choose a random invertible element of s ∈ A 0 . Compute structure constants with respect to the basis s −1 b 1 s, . . . , s −1 b n 2 s. This will be your algebra A 1 . This method works in the division algebra case as well. Actually, it is even simpler as there are no zero divisors in division algebras. In the case orders are also given, one needs some extra assumptions. First one needs to compute an order in the algebra. If one has a basis, then one can multiply the basis elements with a suitable integer which makes the structure constants integral. Thus we obtain a new basis c 1 , . . . , c k 2 such that the structure constants corresponding to this basis are integers. The Z-module generated by c 1 , . . . , c k 2 is then an order in the algebra. We conjugate the algebra and the order with some random invertible element s and we obtain a new order and a new structure constant representation. In the digital signature scheme everything is the same. One only has to generate random elements from the algebra.
Security of the protocols
Let L be a language and (P, V) be an interactive proof system. We denote by view V (P(x), V(x)) the output of the interactive machine V after interacting with the interactive machine P on common input x, (i.e., all messages sent from P to V) and all random bits used by V during the protocol on x.
Recall that (P, V) is perfect-zero knowledge on L if for any probabilistic polynomial time interactive machine V * there exists an expected probabilistic polynomial time algorithm S such that for every x ∈ L and b ∈ {0, 1} the random variables view V * (P(x), V(x)) and S(x, b) are identically distributed.
We have to show that if the algebras are isomorphic then the verifier always accepts otherwise he will reject the input at least with probability 1 2 and that the prover is perfect zeroknowledge.
Theorem 9. The l times iteration of Protocol 1 is a proof of knowledge with knowledge error 2 −l .
Proof. Since φ is an isomorphism then we always have δ(A i ) = ψ(A 0 ). It follows that the protocol is complete , thus the simultaneous execution of l independent copies of the protocol is complete as well. Consider a single iteration of the protocol. Let P * be a dishonest prover i.e., a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which makes the verifier V accept on common input x with probability p. The prover computes B send it to the verifier and replies to challenge i ∈ {0, 1}. If V accepts then he sends the complementary bit 1 − i to P * while keeping the old B. Let δ i be P * 's reply to challenge i. If V accepts again then clearly δ i (A i ) = B for i = 0, 1. It follows that
It follows that if P * successful twice with the same B then one can find a solution the isomorphism problem (A 0 , A 1 ). To complete the proof we show that if P * success with probability p > 1 2 finds an alternative private key in expected polynomial time. Assume that P * is successful with probability p > 1 2 in a simple iteration of the protocol. Then we can run the following algorithm T:
• P * compute ψ and ψ(A 0 ) = B.
• Send ψ to V and then send ψ • φ −1 while keeping B.
• If V accepts both times compute δ −1 1 • δ 0 . • Otherwise repeat until P * succeeds in both challenges.
Let q denote the probability that P * succeeds in both challenges. An easy calculation shows that the expected number of iterations of T is 1 q . We give a lower estimation to q. Let q i denote the probability that P * passes on challenges i = 0, 1. It is clear that q = q 0 q 1 and q 0 + q 1 = 2p. Then we have q = q 0 (2p − q 0 ). By 0 ≤ q i ≤ 1, we have 2p − 1 ≤ q 0 ≤ 1. It is easy to see that the function f (x) = x(2p − x) takes its minimum in the boundary points of the interval [2p − 1, 1]. The minimal value is q = 2p − 1 i.e, q ≥ 2p − 1. Thus, T needs at most 1 2p − 1 iterations in expectation polynomial time. It follows that the protocol is a proof of knowledge with probability 1 2 . By [8, Proposition 4.7.5] we get that the l times iteration of the protocol is a proof of knowledge as well.
It is clear that the protocol is a honest verifier zero-knowledge protocol. Next we prove that the protocol is fraudulent verifier zero-knowledge too. Theorem 10. Protocol 1 is perfect zero-knowledge.
Proof. We will prove that a simulator S exists for an arbitrary verifier V. For a given verifier V let b be the bit chosen by V at the second step of the protocol after having obtained B. Define S by • Choose an isomorphism ψ and i ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. • If c = i output the triple (c, ψ, B), otherwise restart with a new ψ and i.
To prove that S is a valid simulator it is enough to show that if A 0 and A 1 are isomorphic then S runs in expected polynomial time and the distribution of its outputs is the same as the distribution of View V .
Since A 0 is isomorphic to A 1 and ψ is random then b cannot depend on i. It follows that c and i are chosen independently, thus are equal with probability 1 2 . Then S requires two rounds in expectation before terminate. This implies that whether or not S terminates on a particular choice of (c, ψ) is independent of (i, ψ) and hence B. Thus, the distribution of the output is the same as View V .
